

Browling Projecting

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12:DRANDUM FCR: Director of Central Intelligence

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
: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT

Flying Saucers

- 1. Recently an inquiry was conducted by the Office of Scientific Intelligence to determine whether there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects," i.e., flying succers; whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such mational security implications; and what further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
- 2. It was found that the only wait of Government currently studying the problem is the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, which has charged the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) with a responsibility for investigating the reports of sightings. At ATIC there is a group of three officers and two secretaries to which come, through official channels, all reports of sightings. This group conducts investigation of the reports, consulting as required with other Air Force and civilian technical personnel. A world-wide reporting system has been instituted and rajor Air Force Bases have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects. The research is being conducted on a case basis and is designed to provide a satisfactory explanation of each individual sighting.


 ATIC has concluded an arrangement with Eattelle Memorial Institute for the latter to establish a machine indexing system for official reports of sightings.
 - 3. Since 1947, ATIC has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings plus an enormous volume of letters, phone calls, and press reports. During July 1952 alone, official reports totaled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20 percent as unemplained and of those received from January through July 1952 it carries 28 percent unemplained.
 - 4. In its inquiry into this problem, a team from CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence consulted with a representative of Air Force Special Studies Group; discussed the problem with those in charge of the Air Force Project at Wright-Patterson Air Force Pase; reviewed a considerable volume of intelligence reports; checked the Soviet press and promidest indices; and conferred with three CII consultants, who have broad knowledge of the technical areas concerned.



- 5. It was found that the ATIC study is probably valid if the purpose is limited to a case-by-case explanation. However, that study does not solve the more fundamental aspects of the problem. These aspects are to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, and to discover means by which these causes, and their visual or electronic effects, my be identified immediately. The CIA consultants stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present knowledge in the fields of atmospheric, ionospheric, and extraterrestrial phenomena, with the added possibility that the present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor. They recommended that a study group be formed to perform three functions:
 - a. analyze and systematize the factors which constitute the fundamental problem;
 - b. determine the fields of fundamental science which must be investigated in order to reach an understanding of the phenomena involved; and
 - c. mks recommendations for the initiation of appropriate research.

Dr. Julius A. Stratton, Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has indicated to CIA that such a group could be constituted at that Institute. Similarly, Project Lincoln, the Air Force's air defense project at III, could be charged with some of these responsibilities.


- 6. The flying saucer situation contains two elements of danger which, in a situation of international tension, have national security implications. These are:
 - a. <u>Psychological</u> With world-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the time of the investigation, there had been in the Soviet press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Gromyko had made one humorous mention of the subject. With a State-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as to whether or not these sightings:
- - (2) could be predicted, and
 - (3) could be used from a psychological warfare point of view, either offensively or defensively.



The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected both in the United States press and in the pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that a fair proportion of our population is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible.

In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic.

- b. Air Vulnerability The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. The U.S.S.R. is credited with the present cambility of delivering an air attack against the United States, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial ones. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we will run the increasing risk of false alerts and the even greater danger of falsely identifying the real as phantom.
- 7. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors.
- . 8. From an operational point of view, three actions are required:
 - a. Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and electronic phanton so that, in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of energy planes or missiles can be made.
 - b. A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be made of these phenomera by United States psychological warfare planners and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them.
 - c. In order to minimize risk of panic, a rational policy should be established as to what should be told the public regarding the phenomena.
- 9. Other intelligence problems which require determination are:
- a. The present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena.
 - b. Possible Soviet intentions and cambilities to utilize these phenomena to the detriment of United States security interests.



c. The reasons for silence in the Soviet press regarding flying saucers.

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10. Additional research, differing in character and emphasis from that presently being performed by Air Force, will be required to meet the specific needs of both operations and intelligence. Intelligence responsibilities in this field as regards both collection and analysis can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only after much more is known regarding the exact nature of these phenomena.

II. I consider this problem to be of such importance that it should be brought to the attention of the Matienal Security Council. in order that a community-mide coordinated effort towards its solution may be initiated.

E MARSHALL CHADESIL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence